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This paper examines the effects of taxation of human capital, physical capital and foreign
assets in a multi-sector model of endogenous growth. It is shown that in general the growth rate
is reduced by taxes on capital 4labor(human capital) income. When the government faces
no borrowing constraints and is able to commi: to a given set of present and future taxes, it is
shown that the optimal tax plan involves high taxation of both capital.and labor in the short run.
This allows the government to accumulate sufficient assets to rmance spending without any
recourse to distortionary taxation in the long run. When restrictions to government borrowing
and lending are imposed, the model implies that human and physical capital should be taxed
similarly.
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Thispaper studies the effectsoftaxation on economicperformance, factor ailocations and capital
flow. 'nd derives implications for the optimal taxationof factors of production (human andphysical
capital) in an open economy. In particular, it stresses the impact of factor income taxation on the private
sector's decisions to accumulate physical capital and improve labor efficiency through human capital
accumulation. It builds on three related strands of literature: the literature on endogenous economic
growth, the literature on the effects of international taxation on capital flows, and the literature on
dynamic optimal taxation. The positive analysis in this paper examines the effects of labor and capital
income taxation on long-run growth; the normative analysis addresses the question of the optimal path
of taxes on labor income, capital income and the income from foreign assets.
Following the seminal work of Romer (1986) the literature on economic growth has experienced
a revival. Theoretical studies have developed models in which the rate of growth of an economy is
determined endogenously, instead than by exogenous faätors such as preferences, population growth and
technical progress.' For example, Lucas (1988) considered human capital as an additional engine of
economic growth, together with physical capital. This literature suggests that distortions (such as non
lump-sum taxation) will affect the rate of erowth of income, consumption and capital accumulation in an
endogenous growth set-up, while they have only an effect on the kth of such variables in a neoclassical
exogenous growth model.
Traditionally, the normative analysis of optimal taxation of factor incomes was developed in
neoclassical models of exogenous growth. One of the most remarkable results of this literature was
obtained by Chamley (1985, 1986) and Judd (1985). These authors considered an infinite-horizon
exogenous growth models with a representative agent deriving utility from consumption of final goods
and leisure time, and showed that, in such models, the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero in the
long run. Given an exogenous stream of public expenditures, the optimal tax plan consists in taxing
capital income heavily in the short run, since the supply of capital is relatively inelastic; in the long run,
however, capital income tax rates discourage capital accumulation: expenditures should he financed only
with taxes on labor income since labor/leisure (i.e. the individual's time endowment) is the only factor
in fixed supply. This asymmetry between the optimal long run taxation of capital income (zero) and labor
income @ositive) is quite surprising; one should then consider whether the result is robust and under
which conditions it may or may not hold. In particular, it is important to assess whether the Chainley-
Judd result hold in models of endogenous growth where both human and physical capital are engines of
Indeed, some of the factors detennining the long-run rate of growth are the same, but they are considered
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accumulation and growth. -
Insuch a context, we study the role of the technology for human capitalaccumulation; the nature
of the "leisure" activity; and international capital markets in determining the effects oftaxation on long-
run economic growth. We also determine the optimal taxation of human capita], physicalcapita] and
foreign assets. The key characteristics of our model are the following. First, we considera general set-up
where both physical humancapital can enter in the production of new human capital.2 We are
therefore able to analyze whether and how the direct inclusion of physical capitalinputs in the production
of human capita] affects the results about the effects of taxation of growth and theoptima] long run
taxation of factor inco"mes. Second, we study the implications of alternative specifications ofleisure
production for the optimal factor taxation results. Our specification is quite general and includesas sub-
cases the conventional raw time" specification (leisure is the fraction of time that isspent away from
work and study), the "quality time' model (leisure is human capita] times the fraction of thetime
endowment that is not spent working or studying), 'home production" (leisure isa non-market good
produced with human and physical capital) and the case of no leisure. Third, we developan open
economy model that allows us to discuss the optimal taxation factor incomes (including the income from
foreign assets) in a context of international capital mobility.
Our main results, summarized in table I, are the following:
(1) The steady-state growth rate of the economy in models with no leisure isqualitatively similar
to that in models where the leisure activity is modeled as "quality time" or "homeproduction". This is
because in the last two cases leisure is a non-market activity produced withconstant returns to scale to
reproducible factors.Leisure can therefore be reinterpreted as a non-marketconsumption good;
consequently, the model is substantially equivalent to one in which there is no leisure.
(2) Under the three specifications for leisure described above (no leisure,quality time and home
production), the human capital accumulation function has important implications for thedependence of
growth rates on factor income taxes. In particular, if human capital is produced with both human and
physical capital (with CRS in the two inputs), the steady state growth rate of theeconomy and the real
rateof interest depend on both labor and capital income tax rates. In thiscase, a zero long-run taxation
of both capital laborincome will be optimal. However, if human capital accumulation uses human
capital only (with CR5), the steady state growth rate of the economy will not depend on either factor
2SeeRebelo (1991) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) for similar specifications of the humancapital
accumulation equations. Our formulation includes, as subcases, the specificationIa Lucas (1990) where only
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income tax rate.
(3) When human capital is produced only with human capital, long-nan growth does not depend
on tax rates but the optimal long nan taxation of labor and capital will depend on the model of leisure
considered.If leisure is modeled as 'quality time' or home production', the growth rate of the
economy does not depend on factor taxes but the steady state physical to capital ratio depends on both
tax rates. Since tax rates on both factors create such an intertemporal distortion, the optimal long nan
tax on both human and physical capital will be zero in these cases. In the model without leisure, the tax
on physical capital affects the steady state physical to human capital ratio but the tax on human capital
doe,s not. In this sense, the tax on labor is lump-sum and it is therefore optimal to tax only labor in the
long run while the tax on physical capital is zero.
(4) Under a residence-based taxation system, the tax on net foreign assets can he derived
residually once the tax rates on domestic factor incomes are set. Specifically, the tax rate on labor affects
the equilibrium real after-tax rate of return on physical capital. Consequently, the tax rate on foreign
assets will depend on both the tax rate on capital and an labor income. The optimal long-run tax on
foreign assets is shown to be zero whenever the optimal tax on physical capital is zero.
(5) If the government has to balance its budget in every period because of borrowing and leading
restrictions, capital and labor income should be taxed at the same positive rate in the tong run whenever
it is optimal to have zero long run taxation of labor and capital income with an unconstrained
government.3
(6) When the leisure activity is modeled as 'raw time', the balanced growth rate of the economy
depends on both labor and capital income tax rates regardless of the way the human accumulation
technology is specified. This dependence of the growth rate on both tax rates implies the optimal long
run tax on both human and physical capital will be zero in the 'raw time' model.'
In summary, our results imply that the optimal long run tax on both capitallabor income is
zero (or symmetric if borrowing is not allowed) under very genera! conditions regarding the production
SeeRoubini andSala-i-Martin(1992a, 1992b) foroptimal taxation analyses in which the government behavior
is restricted to a balanced budget in every period.
In order to minimize the number of models and cases considered, in this version of the paper we do not
formally consider the case of leisure as 'raw time'. The positive and normative results about this case can be found
in Milesi Ferretti and Roubini (1994). It can also be observed that the case of leisure as raw time' with human
capital produced with human capital only correzponds to the model in Lucas (1990) While Lucas did not derive
the implications of big modelforthe optimal taxation of human capital, our results imply that the optimal long run
tax on capital labor income is zero in the Lucas (1990) model.Tc.xation andEndogenous Growth in Open Economies 4
ofhuman capital and the specification of the leisure activity. Theonly case in which the long i-un tax
on capital is zero while the one on labor is positive is that of a model without leisure and withhuman
capital produced only with human capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss theexisting literature on
taxation, growth and international capital markets. In section 3 we present ourgeneral setup, and in
Section 4 we solve for the competitive market equilibrium. In Section 5we discuss the conditions under
which the steady-state growth rate of the economy and factor allocationsdepend on the tax rates on
capital and labor income. Section 6 presents the solution to the government's optimal taxationproblem.
Section 7 briefly discusses some policy implications, and Section 8 concludes.
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The modern literature on the optimal taxation of factors of production is basedon the seminal
work of Frank Ramsey (1927). Ramsey studied the problem face-I by agovernment that needs to raise
a given amount of revenue by using commodity taxation. The gtvernment would like to raiserevenue
as "efficiently' as possible, but needs to take into account that the behavior of the private sector isgoing
to he influenced by the tax system in place. Formally, the problem is solved by determining theoptimal
behavior of private agents for a given tax system, and then choosing the taxsystem that maximizes
private agents' welfare, subject to the constraints imposed by private agents' behavior andby the
government's revenue needs.
Building on Ramsey's work, Chamley (1985,1986)and Judd (1985) showed that in neoclassical
models of exogenous growth the optimal long-run tax on capital iszero, while the optimal long-run tax
on labor income is positive; capital should be taxed heavily in the shortrun, when it is in relatively
inelastic supply. These results about the asymmetric long-run taxation of laborand capital may he
significantly modified in models in which both human and physical capital are engines ofendogenous
growth. In this regard, Lucas (1990) presented a model of endogenous growth and showed that it is
optimal not to tax capital income in the long run even when human capital accumulation is an additional
source of long-mn growth. He also showed that when the time devoted to human capital accumulation
is exogenous, the Chamley.Judcj result is obtained again —all!ong-run taxation should fall on labor
income. However, he does not derive the implications of his model for theoptimal long run taxation of
labor income when the accumulation of human capital is endogenous.Taxation andEndogenousGrowth in Open Economies 5
Recently,a number of authors have stafled to address this issue! Jones, Manuelli and Rossi
(1993a, l993b) extend the specification of Lucas (1990) by modeling human capital as a non-market good
and by assuming that a flow of final market goods, in addition to effective human capital, enters in the
production of human capital. They show that, if human capital is accumulated with constant returns to
its reproducible inputs Quman capital and market goods), both capital and labor income taxes should be
zero in the long run. Bull (1993a) argues that this result is obtained also in a two-sector model in which
human capital can be "produced" using physical capital, human capital and intermediate goods as inputs,
and/or accumulated through learning-by-doing in the final goods sector. Since government expenditure
is positive, the implementation of this tax plan requires high short-run taxation on both factors, in order
to accumulate government assets that will finance long-run government spending.
Our model contributes to this literature by studying the role of the technology for human capital
accumulation, the nature of "leisure" and international capital markets in determining the effects of
taxation on long-runeconomicgrowth.
Regarding the first issue, it is clear that the presence of human capital as a reproducible factor
modifies the traditional Chamley-Judd results. If human and physical capital were symmetric goods, both
perfectly substitutable with consumption and accumulated through savings, the impact of capita! and labor
taxation would of course be similar (Bull l993a and the first model in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi l993a).
In this case there is nothing peculiar about human capital: it is just a second capital good that is
reproducible with the same technology as physical capital. Assuming that human and physical capital are
perfectly symmetric is, however, restrictive. Human capital differs from physical capital in at least three
dimensions: (I) human capital is not substitutable with consumption; (2) it is a non-market good; and
(3) its accumulation depends on a production fttnction with inputs possibly different from those entering
in the production of final goods and physical capital.
Concerning point (I), while most growth models speci' physical capital as being perfectly
substitutable with consumption (final goods can either be consumed or accumulated in physical capital),
it is more realistic to assume that human capital cannot be consumed (we can consume cars instead of
using them to produce final goods but we cannot "consume our brain").
Concerning point (2), human capital accumulation should be thought as a non-market activity
A number of other contributions do not direetlyconsider the optimal taxation of factor incomes hut study the
effects of exogenous changes in tax rate on labor and capital income on the growth rate of the economy and the
welfare of the representative agect. These contributions include Rebelo (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), Scokey
and Rebe!o (1993) and Trostel (1993).Taxation andEndogenous Growth in Open Economies 6
whose inputs are notsubjectto factor income taxation. Specifically, while the labor incomederiving from
the timespentin the productionof finalgoods can be taxed, the time input (and implicit labor income)
used in production of human capital is usually not taxed. Similarly,any implicitincome of physical
capital goods entering in the production of human capital cannot be taxed either (forexample, a capital
good such as a computer used in the production of final goods earns an income that is taxablehut the
same computer used for increasing one's own human capital earns an implicit income that isnot taxable).
Concerning point (3), the production technology for human capital accumulationmay use different
inputs and/or have different capital intensity relative to the production technology for final goods. For
example, Lucas (1988, 1990) assumes that human capital is a non-market good whose accumulation has
only human capital (or effective labor, i.e. a time fraction of human capital)ic its input. While Lucas
assumes that physical capital inputs do not enter in the production of human capital, Rebelo (1991) and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) consider two-sector models where human capital is producedusing
both human and physical capital, with factor intensities possibly different from those for theproduction
of final goods/physical capital. Alternatively, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a.l993b) consider models
where human capital is a non-market good that is produced with effective humancapital and a fljj of
market goods (but no direct physical capital input).6
The second issue regards the role of leisure specification and its implications for theoptimal
factor taxation. In all the recent models of optimal factor taxation (Lucas1990, Jones, Manuelli and
Rossi l993a, l993b and Bull 1993a, 1993b), leisure is considered as a non-marketgood that requires the
use of 'raw time' only. An older literature, however, considered leisure as a morecomplex non-market
activity requiring the use of both human and physical capital inputs, in addition toraw time. For
example, in Becker (1965) and Heckman (1976) leisure is modeled as 'quality time" (definedas human
capital times the fraction of the time endowment that is not spent working oraccumulating human
capital).' Extending this idea of leisure as being quality time, Greenwood and Hercowitz(199?) model
leisure as a form of 'home production' that uses effective labor and effectivephysical capital in its
6 This specification of the human capital accumulationgoes back to Ben Porath (1967) and has hcen u.ced
recentiy by Trostel (1993) as well.
Suppose that u, and z, are respectively the fraction of the time endowment spent working and accumulating
human capital; then leisure is defined as L, = (I-u, -z,)H,. See Rebelo (1990) for sucha lormulation ni leisure as
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production.'The idea that leisure might be a physical capital intensive activity makes sense since most
forms of leisure require the use of capital goods (think of video-stereo entertainment, sporting equipment
and so on). Whyshouldthe specification of leisure matter? The answer is that when leisure consists of
time off work and education only, it cannot be 'increased" alongside consumption. If, however, it is an
activity that uses reproducible factors, such as human and physical capital, in addition to time, it can be
increased together with consumption; at the same time, the decisions co accumulate human and physical
capital will take into account their impact on the future enjoyment of leisure as well.
Finally, international capital markets are important because domestic investors will consider the
option of investing abroad (and vice versa for foreign investors). Consequently the rate of return that
domestic residents can obtain on foreign assets will affect their decision whether to invest in physical
capital domestically or buy foreign assets. Such a decision is clearly affected by the tax rates on domestic
and foreign capital income. More subtly, it may be influenced by the tax rate on human capital as well
should the latter affect the domestic rate of return on capital.
The literature on taxation and international capita] flows has been developed in a large number
of studies, such as Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1990) and Ruin and Slentrod (1990). These studies have
stressed the importance of the principle governing taxation of foreign assets and liabilities held by agents
of different countries; residence versus source-based taxation of foreign assets will have very different
implications for the world allocation of savings and investment. A number of recent papers.consider the
positive and some normative effects of taxation on growth in open economy models of endogenous
growth. Rebelo (1992) surveys the literature on endogenous economic growth in open economies; Buiter
and Kletrer (1991) consider the effects of residence-based taxes on savings in a two-country OLG
endogenous growth model; Correia (1992) addresses the issue of optimal taxation of capital income in
an open economy while Ruin md Yuen (1993 a, b) consider a two-country model with human and
physical capita] and endogenous fertility choice. These contributions do not, however, address the issue
of the optimal relative taxation of physical jhumancapital in models of endogenous growth.
The literature on the effects of taxation on economic growth has examined a number of other
interesting issues that are not addressed in our model. If government expenditure is endogenous and
productive —forexample, when it enters in the production function for final or capital goods —thelong
Tanñ and lee (1993) go even further in blurring the distinction between consumption of final goods md
leisure by modelling consumption as an activity that always requires the use of time (in a fixed proportion
technology in their model). Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) distinguish 'home production' from leisure.
and model the latter as raw time.Taxation andEndogenous Growth inOpenEconomies 8
run optimal tax on capital might not be zero. This issue has been addressed by Barro (1990), Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi (1993a, 1993b), Judd (1990), Zhu (1991) and Corserti (1992).If there are
externalities in the production of final goods, as in Romer (1987) or in the production of humancapital,
as in Lucas (1988), the optimal tax plan might require subsidies to the activities with positive externalities
(see Yuen (1991)). When the rate of time preference is endogenous, Zee (1994) shows that the growth
effectsof a tax on capital income in a standard Ak model are ambiguous. Judd (1990), King (1990).
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991a), Thu (1991) and Corsetti (1992) study optimal taxation in stochastic
settings. In the presence of rents generated by factors in fixed supply (such as labor in models without
leisure) it may be optimal to tax capital in the long run if there are limits on the taxation of rents (Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi 1993b). Finally, the effects of indirect taxation are examined, in Bull (1993a) and
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (199Th) among others.
3. THEMODEL
We consider a two-sector open economy: a final goods sector that produces consumption goods
and physical capital, and an education sector that produces human capital.' Theeconomy is small, and
takes the world real interest rate as given. Physical capital is perfectly mobile across countries, while
labor (human capital) is immobile.
3.1.Technology
Physical output is produced with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology that uses human
capital Handphysical capital Kasinputs. The technology is assumed to take the Cobb-Douglas form:
(I)
where v(u) isthe fraction of physical (human) capital devoted to the production of goods. the capital
stock is assunied to depreciate at the rate ô.
Human capital is also produced with a CRS technology that uses both human and physical capital
asinputs,as in Rebelo (1991). It depreciates at a rate 8, equal for simplicity to the rate of depreciation
of physical capitaL The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas as well:
'See Rebelo (1991) and Mulligan and Sal.-i-Martin (1993) for similar two-sectormodel formulations.Taxation and Endogenous Growth In Open Economies 9
P,= B(x,K,)' (z,H,) —611, (2)
where .r(z) is the fraction of physical uman) capital devoted to the accumulation of human capital. In
equations(1) and (2) we have implicitly assumed that the point-in-time technologiecare linear: ifa
fraction vol the capital stock is employed in the productionoffinal goods, the effective capital is vK.
This assumption is not necessary for our results: the crucial assumption is that there are CRS in physical
and human capital,thereproducible factors.'°
3.2.The governmenr
Thegovernment needs to finance an exogenously given path of public expenditure, using domestic
bond issues, factor income taxation and taxation of foreign assets, under the residence principle. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the government borrows on]y domestically and that government bonds
are tax-exempt. The instantaneous budget constraint of the government is given by:
E,—rB+G,—7 (3)
whereB, are government bonds, r, is their rate of interest and ] is government revenue out of taxation.
In every period, the resource constraint of the economy is given by the income-expenditure identity:
(4)
where I is Gross Domestic Product, Cisprivate consumption, C is government expenditure, Fisnet
foreign assets and r is the world interest rate.
3.3.Private agents
Theeconomy is inhabited by identical atomistic agents. They choose consumption, investment




wherep is the rate of time preference and Lisa leisure activityN, that could include for example home
'° Mulligan andSala-i-Martin (1993) discussmore in detail the role of the point-in-time lcchnologies.Taxation andEndogenous Growth in Open EconomIes 10
production. This maximization is subject to the constraint on human capital accumulation given by (2)
and an instantaneous budget constraint:
R,t(1 —r,'5vK.R,(1 —-r,M)u,H,-+r,B,÷r'(l -ic)Fy-C,—K, -fl,—P,-5K, ￿0(6)
where Hr. 2?", r,r', r' andr" are the rates of return and the tax rates on capital income, labor income
and foreignassets,respectively. Equation (6) simply states that consumption and asset accumulation have
to be financed with net incomefromcapital, labor and currentassetholdings.Clearly total taxrevenues
Tareequal to r1HrvK+ r'R"uH+r"rF.
The leisure activity ("home production") uses time, human and physieal capital as inputs, with
a Cobb-Douglas technology:
L, "[(I—v,—x,)K]'f(l —ii, —z,)ll,]'" (7)
where each individual's time endowment hasbeennormalizedto one.
Forsimplicity, we assume that the instantaneous utility function takes a Constant Interteniporal
Elasticity of Substitution (CIES) form:
u(C,,L3(CL'-'1
where 8 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This functional form has been shown
to be consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
This utility function is similar to the one used in Greenwood and Hercowita (1991). Aspecial
case of this occurs wheny =0,so that leisure is "quality time", as in Becker (1965), Heckman (1976)
and Rebelo (1991).
3.4. Finns
Firmsrent capital fromhouseholds at the rate of interest Hr and hire labor at the wage rate K'.
They will hire labor and capital up to the point at which their marginal product equals their marginal cost:
!aA.LfL (9)




4. THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The representative consumer takes the paths of iK,iTMand 9 as given and chooses the paths of
C, K, H, F, B, u, t,x,z to maximize (5) subject to (2) and (6). This case includes as its suheases three
models of leisure: the "borne production" model ( >0 and 0 C yC 1); the "quality time" model (tj>0
and y=O) and the "no leisure" model (ip=0)."
We can define non-human wealth W, =K,+ B + F, and re-write (6) as follows:






Next, we observe that since domestic bonds and foreign assets are perfect substitutes for the consumer,
they should yield the same after-tax rate of return:
r,=r'(l—4') (12)
This also implies that the consumer's maximization problem can only determine aggregate holdings of
domestic and foreign bonds (B, + F,); the amount of domestic bonds being held is determined by the
supply from the government.







For the raw time' model of leisure (L =J-u-z)see Milesi-Ferretti and Rouhini(l993)Taxadon andEndogenousGrowth in Open Economies 12
— =
C, (16)
'?e'C,'L,'°"=pB$Kñ (17) I —v—x '' z,H,
R,"(1 —r7)H,— C (18) lUZ'
(1-
eC, LIM_pB( I -$)H, 9)
I —u,—z, Zr!!,
The remaining two FOCs are the constraints (2) and (6). Equation (13) states that theshadow price of
consumption (physical capital) must equal the marginal utility of consumption inevery period.Equation
(14)is the FOC for capita] accumulation: the rate of change of the shadowprice of consumption must
equal the marginal product of capital net of tax, which must also equal the rate of return ongovernment
bonds. Equation (15) is the corresponding FOC for human capital accumulation,relating the change in
the shadow price of human capita] to its marginal rate of return.Equation (16) and (18) describe the
optimal allocation of physical and human capital respectively between production of marketgoods and
"home production". Finally, conditions (17) and (19) describe theoptimal allocation of physical and
human capital between the "education" sector and home production.
The transversality conditions are:
Iim_,_ X, K 0
(20) lim_ z,H, =0
From (12) and (14) it is straightforward to obtain:
r, =r" (I -)=R,'(l-r)6 (21)
That is, under residence-based taxation the interest rate on domestic bonds mustequal the net after-tax
rate of return on capital and the after-tax rate of return on foreign assets. This result isclearly an
implication of the assumption that in the absence of uncertainty domestic bonds, domesticcapital and
foreign assets are perfect substitutes.Taxation and Endogenous GrowthinOpenEconomies 13
Usingequations (9), (10) and (16)-(19) we can express thesectora] allocation offactors asa
functionof technology parameters and taxes:
1._iJsi l t!._.IJJzh1lvi; (22) I—ai_,qz, 1—a y i_,.'1—u,—z,
According to (22), when the tax on labor income (capital income) rises (falls), the capital/labor ratio in
the sector producing goods rises with respect to the capital/labor ratio in the sector producing human
capita] and with respect to the capital/labor ratio in the home production sector. It is interesting to note
that changes in tax rates do j cause changes in the relative capital intensity between the education sector
and the home production sector, since both these sectors are not directly taxed.
This economy will exhibit a balanced growth path, along which consumption, physical capital and
human capital grow at the same rate, while factor allocations (u, v, x and z) remain constant.' g-




where time subscripts have been omitted. Along the balanced growth path, the shadow prices of physical
and human capital must decline at the same rate. Equating (13) and (15) and using (9), (10), (17) and






where the terms D, are constantsinvolvingthe technology parameters a, $,Aand B, reported in the
Appendix. The ratio of "market" consumption to leisure canbedetermined in an analogous fashion, and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) and Bane and Sala-i-Martin (1994) give the necessary conditions for the
existence of a balanced growth path.Taxation and_Endogenou,r GrowthInOpenEconomies 14
is given by:
[D3(I -?PX'O(I - (25)
Clearly,higher factor income tax rates will tend to shift consumption from "markeC goods to "home
production".
Using (10), (13), (23)and(24) we obtain the balanced growth rate of the economy (equation 26)
and the steady state net real interest rate (equation 27):
=9-(l[D4(l -y'(1 -d-o) (26)
r[D4(l -r0(l _7(1.)Jfl7 -o (27)
From equations (24), (25) and (26) it is clear that bothtax rateson domestic factor incomes will in
general distortthe allocation offactors between sectors and reduce the rate of grothof the economy.
When will the economy reachthe balanced growth path?Inaclosed economy, theeconomyhas
to accumulate physical and human capital until it reaches the capital-laborratiothat is associatedwith
balanced growth.Inanopen economy, however, it ispossibleto augment (reduce) thedomesticcapital
stock instantaneously by borrowing (lending) oninternationalcapital markets. This is what will happen,
and thereforethe balancedgroWTh pathwill be reachedimmediately. In other words,iftax rates donot
changeovertimea small openeconomywill exhibitno transitionaldynamics.
5. TAXATIONAND LONG-RUN GROWTH
Wewill now discuss the main results ofthebalancedgrowth solutionofourmodel. In particular,
we analyze thconditionsunder whichthebalancedgrowth solutions ofthemodeldepend on thetax rates
onlabor(1,capital income (r')and incomefromnet foreignassets(i').
First, note thatthe"qualitytime modelof leisure (y= 0),the "homeproduction"rnodclof
leisure(y > 0) and the modelwithno leisure ( = 0) do not qualitatively differ fromeachother since
the equilibrium after-tax real interest is identicalinthe three models(itdoes not depend cm either or
,j), Moreover, the growth rate in the "qualitytime" and "home production" modelsis equal and itsratio
relative to the growth rate in the"noleisure" model is a constant ((O/(9-t(l-8))])thatdepends only onTaxation and EndogenousGrowth InOpenEconomies is
parametersoftheutility ftinction U and i (see equation 26)."
This qualitative similarity of 'quality time' and 'home production'modelsof leisure with the
case of no leisure results from the fact that leisure is modeled as a non-market activity produced with
constant returns to scale to reproducible factors —either human capital only (when yO) or both human
and physical capital (when > 0). Therefore, leisure can be reinterpreted in these two cases as a non-
market consumption good and the model is substantially equivalent to one in which there is no leisure.
Second, note that the assumption of perfect capital mobility and the hypothesis of residence-based
taxation imply that the after-tax return on all investments (domestic capital, domestic bonds and foreign
assets) are equal in e"ery period (see equation 21). In the absence of taxation of foreign asset income,
perfect capital mobility should lead to the equalization of domestic real rates of return with the world
interest rate and the equalization of domestic and world growth rates. In fact, assume that in the absence
of taxation of domestic capital and labor income, the domestic real interest rate is equal to the world rate
(r=r); this would be the case if the technology and preference parameters in the world economy were
equal to those in the domestic economy and if there were no distortionary taxes in the world economy.
This would also imply that, in the absence of domestic distortionary taxes on capital and labor, the home
growth rate of consumption and GNP would be equal to the world growth rate.Id
Consider now the effects of residence-based taxation, This form of taxation allows the after-tax
return earned by domestic residents to differ from the world interest rate: the net after-tax return on
domestic capital will be equal to the world real interest rate net of the tax on domestic residents' income
from foreign assets. This divergence between domestic and world interest rates under residence-based
taxation implies that domestic and world growth rates will also differ (see Rebelo 1991, 1992 on this
point).
Next, the solutidn (27) for the steady state net after-tax domestic real interest rate shows that, in
general, this real return will depend both on the tax on domestic capital income and on labor income.
Given the equality between this real return and the after-tax return on foreign assets, it follows thdt:
" A similar result was derived by Rebelo (1991) who compared the growth rates in a model with leisure as
uality time and in a model where an exogenous fraction of time is devoted to leisure.
'Buiter andKletier(1992) show that long ito differences between home and world GNP growth rates can
persist with perfect capitalmobilityif somegoodsare non-tradedandareproduced withnon-tradedgoodsonly (this
isthe case of human capital in their model). See also Rebelo([992) for adiscussionof nori-tradednessand growth
equalization.Taxation andEndogenous Growth in Open Economies 16
Proposition1Inthe case of fi >0,the residence razation principle that.for any given tax on
labor and capita! income, there is a unique feasible value for the tax on foreign assets so that thereturns
to domestic and foreign investments are equalized. Such a tax rate is equal to:
(28)
wherer is defined in equation (27).
Proof Seeequations (12) and (21). 0
Accordingto this proposition, once the tax rate on capital income and labor income are chosen,
the equilibrium after-tax real interest rate is determined; thcrefoe, there is only one value for the tax on
income from foreign assets such that the returns to domestic and foreign investments are equal.
Proposition 2 Inthe case of fi > 0, since the equilibrium real interest rate i.c a neMarive function q[thc
labor income nix, the equilibrium sax on foreign assets will be a positive function of the tax on labor
income.
Proof See equations(21) and (27).0
Intuitively,since an increase in the tax on labor income reduces the after tax real interest rate r, a higher
tax on foreign asset income is requh-ed to maintain the parity between domestic and foreign returns.
Proposition 3When physical capital does not enter in the production of human capital (3 = 0), the
steady state growth raze of the economy and the equilibrium rea( interest rate are independent of the tax
rates on capital j labor income regardless of how the leisure activity is modeled. In this case:
1
[B—p—6] (29) C O-(l-8)
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ProofSeeequations (26) and (27).
The intuition for the result is simple. If human capital is produced with human capital only, an
increase in the labor tax rate will reduce the return to currentwork effortbut it will also reduce the return
to human capital accumulation (and the return to the leisure activity) by the same amount. Therefore,
the fraction of time spent working,studying andproducingleisurewillnotbeaffected bya change inthe
labortax rate and the rate of growth of the economy and the real interest rate will be unaffected as well.
It is known that equation (30) represents the steady state growth rate of economies a Ia Lucas
(1988) where human "capital accumulation is CR5 in human capital only (F? = Bill) and there is no
leisure (, = 0) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1994). Our analysis generalizes that result by showing that.
in the Lucas case of fi=O, a qualitatively similar steady state solution is obtained when we consider
economies where leisure is introduced and modeled as "quality time" or "home production". Specifically,
the growth rate will be independent of the technological parameters for the production of final goods and
physical capital ( and A) while the net real interest rate will be independent of preferences and equal to
the productivity levelof humancapital minus depreciation (B-i5).
Proposition 4 W7zen fi = 0, the steady state physical to human capital ratio in the production offinal




Proof Seeequation (24). V
The explanation for the independence of the capital ratio from the labor tax is the same as the one
given in Proposition 3. A change in the capital income tax rate will instead reduce the return to physical
capital accumulation while not affecting the return to human capital accumulation; therefore, the physical
to human capital ratio in the production of final goods will fall.
Proposition 5When $ = 0, the steady state physical to human capital ratio in the economy is
independent of the tar rate on labor income but a negative function of the tax raic on capital income inTaxorion and Endogenotis Growth in Open Economies 18
themodel with no leisure; in the models whereleisureis "qua/ia'ytine"or home production - such a
capitalratio depends on both the tax on humanant/physical capitaL
Proof From (22), the equilibrium capital/labor ratio in the economy is given by
(32)
From Proposition I, we know that when $= 0,the fraction z of time spent accumulating human capital
is independent of both tax rates. When >0,we can use the equality between the first and the third
term in (22) to express v as a function of a and both tax rates. Using the economy's resource constraint
(4), we can establish that u, v and v/uarea function of both tax rates. Since from (23) we know that
vK/ulf depends only on r', it follows that K/il is a function of bath tax rates. Wheny =0,v =I;the
resource constraint (4) establishes that a is a function of both tax rates. From equation (28) it follows that
K/H is also a function of both tax rates.Finally, when there is no leisure=I-a:sthce z is
independent of both tax rates (Proposition 1), so is a. In this case (32) establishes that K/H depends only
on the tax race on physical capital.
The explanation for the above proposition is the following. As discussed above, when there is
no leisure in the model, the tax on labor income does not affect the fraction of time spent working (a)
and studying (I-u)aslong as fi= 0.Then, since v =Iin this case, equation (31) shows that the
equilibrium physical to human capital ratio in the economy will also be independent of ? hut dependent
on/. In the specifications where leisure is modeled as "quality time" or "homeproduction", the tax on
labor income does not affect the fraction of time spent studying (z) (and therefore does not affectgrowth)
but it affects the allocation of time between work (a) and leisure activit,s (I -u-z).In particular, an
increase in the labor tax reduces the fraction of time spent working and increases the fraction of time
spent in the leisure activity. Therefore, the equilibrium human and physical capital in the economy will
be affected by the labor tax. The above proposition is important for the derivation of the optimal
taxation of factors. In fact, when $= 0and there is no leisure, the labor tax does not create any
intertemporal distortion: it does not affect either the growth rate of the economy nor the capital labor ratio
in the economy. Conversely, if leisure is modeled as "quality time" or "home production" the labor tax
does not affect growth but it creates an intertempora] distortion since the economy wide K/H is affected.
A tax on capital income is always distortionary when $= 0becausc it affec:s the physical to humanTaxation and Endogenous Growth in Open Economies 19
capitalratio regardless of whether thereis leisure or not in the model.
Proposition 6 When $= 0,the equilibrium tat on foreign asset income wi II not depend on the tax rates
on labor and capital income. In this case:
(33)
Proof Seeequation (27).
Theintuition for the proposition is dear. When =0,the real after-taxinterestrate is a
constant, B -6,that does not depend on either the tax rate on capital or labor income. Therefore, the
unique value of the tax on foreign asset income that equalizes returns to domestic and foreign investments
will be independent of the choice of the taxoncapital and labor.
Proposition 7 When physical capital enters in the production of human capital ($>0) the steady crate
growth rate of the economy will negatively depend on the tax rare on both capital income and labor
income. Moreover, the steady state physical to human capital ratios in the final goods arid human capital
sectors will also depend on both factor tax rates.
Proof Seeequations(24) and (26).Ij
Theintuition for the proposition is easier to present for the case of no leisure, hut is the same
in the equivalent cases ofleisureas 'qualitytime'or 'home production'. We showed abovethatwhen
= 0,the returntoandthecost of human capital accumulation (i.e. the net of tax wage) are affected
in thesame proportionbya change inlabortaxes,leavingthetimeallocation decisionunchanged. In
otherterms, since the cost of human capital accumulation is effective!>'tax-deductible, laborincome
taxationdoes not affect the incentive to accumulate human capital.'5 However, if physical capital is also
used in the production of new human capital @>0), the return to human capital is reduced more than
itscost.In particular, the cost of physical capital inputs used in the production of human capital is not
See Trostel (1993) for a detailed presentationof thisargument.Taxation and Endogenous Growth in Open Economies
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reduced bythe labor income tax since theseinputsare not tax deduciible. More generally, as suggested
by Trostel (1993), ifanyother inputs in addition to human capita] enter in theproduction of human
capital,itsreturn will be reduced by more than itscost.Therefore humancapita]accumulation will be
reducedby an increase in the labor tax rate.
The above results imply that, for the three specifications of theleisure activity considered so far
(the "quality time", the "home production" and the "no leisure"models), the specification of the human
capital accumulation function has important implications for thedependence of growth rates on factor
income taxes. In particular, if human capital is produced withkQth human and physical capital (with
CRSinthe two inputs)', the steady state growth late of theeconomy depends on both factor tax rates.
However, if human capital accumulation uses human capital s2ily (withCRS), the steady state growth rate
of the economy will not depend on either factor income taxrate. Moreover, in this case the steady state
ratio between effective human and physical capital willdepend on the tax on caphal income but not on
the labor income tax.
The result that the dependence of the growth rate on factortax rates has to do with whether
physical capital enters in the production of human capital (i.e. on whether $ispositive or zero) holds
both when leisure does not enter the utility function and when itis produced with constant returns in
reproducible factors. \Vhat happens in the case in which leisure is not produced withconstant returns
to reproducible factors 7 One such case —leisuremodeled as a "raw time" activity —isthe one most
studied in the literature.'6 In this case "raw time" is anon-reproducible fatter that is constrained by
the agent's total time endowment, in Milesi•Feryeffl and Roubini(1994) we show that, if leisure is
modeled as "raw time" —or,more generally, as an activity not produced with CRS in reproducible
factors --thebalanced growth rate of the economy will always dependon the tax rates on capital and
labor income regardless of whether physical capital inputs enteror not in the production of human capita]
(i.e. regardless of whether ftispositive or zero).'7
"SeeCharniey (1986), Lucas (1990), Jones, Nianuelli and Rossi (I99)a, 1993b) and Bull (1993a) for sucha
specification of leisure in optimal taxation analyses.
llTheintuition for the result is the following (see Milesi'Ferretd and Roubini, 1994 fora forms] proof).
Regardless of the value of ft. when leisureis modeledas "raw time", an incrt.ase in human capital will increase the
productivity of time spent producing goods or accumuiating human capital but will not affect the marginalutility of leisure. Therefore, the return to the accumulation of human capital willnow depend on the time spent in leisure
activities. Consider now the effects of an increase in the labor tax: while the rclativccost and return to working venusaccumulating humancapital are unchanged by such a change inlabortaxes, the return to the leisure activity
is increased since the time spt in leisure is untaxed. The ensuing increase in timespent in leiiurezeduccsthe lime
spent accumulating human capital and therefore its return. The reduction in the return zoinvslmcntin humanTaxation and EndogenousGrowth inOpen &onomies 21
Asdiscussed above, residence-based taxation allows theafter-tax return earned by domestic
residentstodiffer from the world interest rate. This divergence between domestic and world interest
rates underresidence-based taxation impliesthatdomestic andworldgrowth rateswillalso differ.
Residence-basedtaxation therefore implies that the long-run equilibrium and growth rate of anopen
economy will be equal to that of a closed economy. The main difference relative to the closed economy
case is the absence of transitional dynamics in an open economy. Starting from an initial equilibrium
without international capital flows, the opening of international capital markets will imply that, given
the initial conditions (the initial stock of physical and human capital), the country will borrow or lend
from the rest of the world so as to instantaneously change the stock of domestic capital to the steady state
desired ratio of physical and human capital. In the presence of perfect capital mobility, the economy will
therefore jump to the long run allocation of resources and grow along the balanced growth path; while
in a closed economy the transition to the balanced growth path will take time.
6. OPTIMAL TAXATION ANALYSIS
So far, we have discussed the conditions under which the growth rate of the economy and the
capital ratios in the various sectors will depend on the tax rates on labor and capital income. We turn
now to the analysis of the conditions under which it will be optimal to have a zero long run taxation of
a factor of production.
6.1Optima! Long-Run Taxation ofLaborand Capita!
Whilea formal analysis of optimal tax rates on the two factors require the solution of a 'restricted
Ramsey planner's problem" where the government chooses the path of tax rates with the purpose of
maximizing the representative agent's welfare, taking into account the optimizing behavior of this agent.
it is possible to get the intuition for the optimal taxation results by considering the link between growth
rates and tax rates." Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the revenue from taiation of
foreign assets initially held by private agents is rebated lump-sum to consumers: otherwise, it is always
optimal for the domestic government to "confiscate" initial foreign assets by setting the tax as high as
possible.
capital will then imply that the equilibrium real interest rite is reduced and thereforetherate of growth of the
economy is reduced in the steady state. Therefore, in the model withleisureas •raw time' the growthrateof the
economy will depend on the tax rates on both factors of production.
"InMilesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1994) we solve such a 'restricted Ramsey pLanners problem" in a closed
economy and provide formal proof of the optimal taxation results presented below.Taxation and EndogenousGrowthin Open Economies 22
Theoptimal taxation analysis implies the following five results:
1. When both human and physical capital enter in the production of human capital (ft> 0),the
optimal long run lax on both capital and labor income is zero when leisure is CR5 in reproducible
factors (p >0)or when there is no leisure ('0).
2. The optimal long run tax on both capital and labor income is zero when leisure is modeled as
"raw time" regardless of how human capital is produced (i.e. for any value of ft).
3.When only human capital enters in the production of human capital (ft= 0),the optimal long
run tax ott both capital and labor income is zero when leisure is modeled as "quality time' or
Thome production".
4. When only human capital enters in the production of human capital (ft= 0),the optima! long
run tax on capital is zero while the one on labor income is positive in the mode] with no leisure.
5. The optimal long-run tax on foreign assets income will be zero regardless of the value of fi.
The intuition for the first result can be easily understood by considering the relation between the
growth rate of the economy and the tax rates. The analysis of Chainley suggests that any tax that distorts
a long run intertemporal decision should be set equal to zero. In an endogenous growth framework, any
tax distortion that reduces the long run growth rate of the economy will have large and permanent costs
(in terms of present discounted value of lost consumption and utility) and should therefore be set equal
to zero.Sincethe balanced growth rate of the economy is dependent on both tax rates in models without
leisure and in models where leisure is CR5 in reproducible factors when $>0,ii follows that the optimal
tax on labor and capital income should he zero in these cases.
The basic principle that any tax the affects long run growth should be set to zero in the long run
is behind the second result regarding optimal taxation in the specifications of leisure as "raw time". In
particular, in the "raw time" model of leisure, the optimal long rimtaxrate on capital and labor income
is zero regardless of whether capital inputs enter or not in the production of human capital (i.e..
regardless of the value of $)becausein that model the long-run growth rate depends on both tax rates
regardless of the value of fi.Taxation and Endogenous Growth in Open Economies 23
While a dependenceof the long run growth rate on a tax rate impliesthat such a tax rate should
be set equal zero in the long run, what can we say about the cases in which long-mngrowth is
independent of the tax rate? Such independence of growth from tax rates is obtained, in our model, in
three models of leisure (when leisure CR5 in reproducible factors and when there is no leisure) whenever
= 0. Moreover, in the models with leisure as "home production0 and "quality time", the equilibrium
physical to human capital ratio in the economy is affected by both tax rates; conversely, in the model
without leisure the equilibrium physical to human capital ratio in the economy is affected by the tax on
capital but is not affected by the tax on labor. Therefore, a steady state tax on capital income distorts
the intertemporal choice of physical to human capital regardless of whether leisure brings utility. Not
so for the labor tax: a steady state tax on labor income distorts the physical to human capital ratio when
there is leisure but does not create any intertemporal distortion when there is no leisure in the model.
Since optimal taxation principles suggest that we should not distort interteinpoiai choices, it
follows that when the two tax rates do not affect the long term growth rate and only one of the two tax
rates affects the steady state capital ratio, the optimal long run tax plan will be the following: set to zero
the tax rate on the factor that distorts both the growth rate and the capital ratio; set to a positive value
the tax rate on the factor that does not distort the long run physical to human capital ratio. The third and
fourth results therefore follow: when fi = 0, the model specifications of the leisure activity as "quality
time", Thome production" imply that the optimal long run tax rate on both capital and labor income will
be equal to zero; in the specification without leisure the optimal long run tax rate on capital income will
be zero while the optimal long run tax rate on labor income will be positive.
Consider next the implications of the above optimal taxation analysis for the taxation of foreign
asset income. We showed above that, in the absence of taxation of domestic capital and labor Income,
the domestic real interest rate is equal to the world rate (r = () and the home growth rate of
consumption and GNP would be equal to the world growth rate. However, residence-based taxation will
lead to a diffetence between the after tax return earned by domestic residents and the world interest rate,
Similarly, the domestic growth rate will differ from the world rate.
What will then be the optimal long run tax on foreign asset income? If fi>0, the optimal tax
on capital and labor income is zero; therefore, the optimal tax on foreign asset income will be zero as
well and domestic growth will equal the world rate. Suppose now that fi = 0; if there is no leisure in
the model, the optimal long-run tax on capital income is zero while it is positive for labor income; the
domestic real interest rate will equal the world rate, It follows that the optimal long-run tax on foreign
asset income will be zero again. Finally, in the models with leisure and $=0, the optimal tax on bothTaxation andEridogenous Growth in Open Economies 24
capitaland laborincome iszero;therefore,the optimal tax on foreign asset income will be zeroas well.
It then follows thatthe optimallong-run tax on foreign asset income is zeroregardless of thevalueof
0;in this sense the long run taxation of foreign asset income is equal to that of domesticcapital.
How do the above results about optimal taxationcompare with those in the literarure on open
economy? Rebelo (1992) considers the relation between taxation and growth inopen economies but does
not consider the optimal taxation of incomes. As in our analysis, he finds that theassumption of perfect
capital mobilityshould lead to interestrate and growth rate equalization between the domesticeconomy
andthe world;healso shows that only residence-basedtaxationwill allow a wedge between domestic and
worldInterestratesandgrowth rates.Correia (1992) considersthe optimaltaxation of capitalincome
in a simple Ak one-sector model of endogenous growth where human capital and leisurearenot
considered. She replicates the Chamley result on the zero optimal taxation of capitalincome; since she
assumes residence-based taxation with equal tax rate on domestic capital income and foreign asset income,
the optimal zero long-run taxation of capital income corresponds a zero taxcn foreign asset income as
well. Ruin and Yuen (1993) consider a two-sector, two-country model ofendogenous growth with
endogenous fertility choice. Agent derive utility from consumption of goods and from the number of
their offsprings. The number of offsprings is determined taking into account thatchild-rearing requires
a fraction of the household time endowment. Human capital is increased with both physical and human
capital inputs.They formallyprove that, under residence-based taxation, the optimal tax on capital
income and foreign asset incomeispositive in the short-runandzero in the long-run(an applicationof
theChamley result in theopen economy)."
6.2 Growth-Maximizing Tax Policies with a Balanced Budge:
Optimal taxation plans in dynamic growth models are generally of the following nature. Tax rates
on factors are positive in the short run (when factors are in semi-fixed supply) and lower (possibly zero)
in the long run. Given an exogenous path of government expenditures this optimal taxationplan consists
"They also argue, without a formal proof, that the optimal long-run tax on labor income should be positive.
Thelatter claim is puzzling. Their model, in fact, corresponds to a two-sector model with 0> 0 since both
physical and human capital enter in the production of human capital. Moreover, their model is equivalent to a
model where utility is obtained from leisure and leisure is produced with 'raw Ume:infact, agents get utility from
children, and child-rearing requires 'raw time only. We know that a model with leisure being produced with raw
time implies a dependence of the long run growth on capital i4 labor income taxesregardless of fi; therefore the
optimal long run tax on labor should be zero. Moreover, even if children had been produced with 'quality time
rather than raw time, the assumption of 9> Cia their model would imply that the growth rate would stilldepend
on the tax on labor income and that tax should therefore be equal to zero in the long run.Taxation and EndogenousGroMh in Open Economies 25
oftaxing both factors in the short run, and financing spending in the long run throughaccumulated
budget surpluses. This implies that the government should be able to accumulate enough assets in the
short run to be able live off their return in the long run. Such an accumulation of assetsby the
government is clearly not empirically realistic.
It is therefore interesting to consider the nature of an optimal taxation plan when the ability of
the government to borrow or lend is restricted. In the limiting case where no intertemporal borrowing
is allowed so that the government has to balance its budget in every period, we can study which tax
policies will be growth maximizing (i.e. welfare maximizing) in the long run. We will consider only the
steady state and assume that the government spending is a constant fraction of output. We assume that
the government has to run a balanced budget in every period; moreover we assume that the revenues from
foreigu asset are rebated in lump-sum form to private agents so that capital and labor income are the only
two sources of financing of government spending.X Then, the budget constraint of the government will
be:
g.4..art÷(1_a)r2 (34)
where g is the steady state ratio of government spending to output. We can then consider which steady
state tax policies will maximize the growth rate by maximizing the growth solution (28) (for the general
case of$ > 0) subject to the above government budget constraint (34). The solution of this problem is:
(35)
The equation shows that the growth-maximizing capital and labor income tax rates are equal, i.e. a
common income tax onll factor incomes is optimal. The result is interesting because it suggests that,
as long as the growth rate of the economy is affected by both tax rates, the optimal long run tax policy
is to tax both factors at the same rate. As we argued above, if the behavior of the government is not
constrained (so that it an borrow and lend), labor and capital should be taxed at the longrun rate
of zero. Similarly, if the government is constrained to run a budget balance in every period, the optimal
long run tax on labor and capital will still be the im for both factors and equal to the government
spending to output ratio that has to be financed in every period.
We make the assumption of a rebate of foreign asset income revenue in order to avoid having to solve
explicitly (or the equilibiium value of foreign assets. In practice, since the revenues from foreign asset income are
quite small, assuming that they sic rebated is of no qualitative consequence,Taxation andEndogenousGrowth inOpenEconomies 26
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What are the policy implications of our results for the actual conduct oftax policy ? In recent
years, the question of the optimal degree of taxation of capitaJ income has been hotly debated inacademic
and policy circles. For example, in many industrial countries the issue ofcapital gains taxation has
attracted a lot of attention. The results of Charnley (1985, 1986) andJudd(1985), derived in neoclassical
exogenous growth models, provided a theoretical rationale for the widely held view that the taxation of
capital income should be kept at a minimum, because such taxes can reduce capital accumulation.Our
analysis suggests that while the taxation of capital income is distonionary and can have negativegrowth
consequences when the growth rate of the economy is endogenous, a similar effect is caused by the
taxation of labor income when human capital is an additional engine of economicgrowth. Such an effect
of labor taxation is absent in exogenous growth models, where the labor factorcannot he accumulated
in the form of human capital.
In this sense, the analysis suggests that distortionary taxes have in generalnegative growth effects
and should be kept at a minimum in the long run. What are the short-run implications?Formally, in the
absence of constraints on the ability of the government to borrow and lend, theoptimal taxation problem
yields a solution that involves initially high taxes on both human and physicalcapital. This allows the
government to accumulate a sufficient quantity of assets to finance government expenditure in the long
run without any further recourse to taxation. In practice, this is not a realistic solution, fora number of
reasons.
The first practitalproblemis that the government is unable to commit to a givenpath01taxes
fromnowon to the foreseeable future. Therefore, this optimal taxation scheme will be subject to time-
consistency problems. -In particular,ineveryperiod the government will have an incentivetotax more
heavilyexistingcapital, while refraining from taxing investment.2'
Asecondproblem is that in practice government expenditure is not exogenous, and high short-run
rates of taxation may leadtomore spending, ratherthanto the accumulation of assets to finance long-mn
expenditure.
A third problem is that in practice the ability of the government to borrow and lend islikely to
be restricted. In the limit case in which the government has to balance itsbudget in every period, the
'Unlikeother optimal taxation models, however, our model can allow us to determine a meaningful optimal
path of tuition even when tax decisions have to be taken sequentially. The reason is that the supply of taxable
physical capital is elastic even in the abort run, because capital can have alteniative uses in the home production
or the human capital sector. This implies that setting the capital income tax uo confiscatory levels is unfeasible.Taxation and Endogenous Growth in Open Economies 27
modelsuggests that physical and human capital should be taxed in a similar fashion. In this sense, the
important message of the paper is not that taxation of labor and capital income should be high in the short
run and zero in the long run; it is rather that human and physical capital should be taxed similarly if they
both contribute to accumulation and long-mn growth.
With regard to the taxation of foreign assets, endogenous growth models suggest that differential
taxation of domestic and foreign asset income is feasible only with a residence-based taxation scheme,
provided, of course, that foreign asset income can effectively be recorded and taxed. With source-based
taxation, return differentials would imply unlimited amounts of capital inflows or outflows. Under
residence-based taxation, the tax on net foreign asset income should be set at the level that equates
domestic and foreign post-tax returns on capital. If zero taxation of domestic capital is optimal and
feasible, zero taxation of foreign assets would also ensue.
In this paper we have not considered indirect taxes. The relative merits of indirect versus direct
taxation have been widely discussed in the literature; in the framework of neoclassical growth models,
it has been suggested that consumption taxation is superior to direct factor income taxation. However,
the results of Jones, Manuelli and Ros.si (1993b) and Bull (1993a) suggest that in the long run all taxes,
including a consumption tax, ought to be zero. The reason is that when growth is endogenous even a
distortionary consumption tax affects long-run growth. It would, however, be interesting to consider the
implications for indirect taxation of restrictions on the government's ability to borrow and lend.
Another interesting policy aspect that is captured with the 'home production' specification is the
notion that factors of production in the 'market" sector may be elastically supplied even in the short run.
In practice, the "home production" sector may be reinterpreted as the 'informal" sector of the economy,
wherecapitaland labor income are not taxed, The analysis suggests that 'excessive' taxation of incomes
in the formal sector will lead agents to transfer capital and labor resources to the informal sector in order
to avoid taxation.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have considered the role of the human capital accumulation technology and of
the nature of 'leisure' activity in determining the optimal taxation of labor, capital and foreign assets in
a small, open economy. Traditional optimal taxation analyses in exogenous growth models stressed that
the tax rate on capital income should be zero in the long run, while the one on labor should be positive.
We have shown that in endogenous growth models this result is replicated only under restrictive
specifications of human capital accumulation and leisure production. Under more general specificationsTaxation and Endogenous GrowthinOpenEconomIes 28
of these processes, capital and labor income should be taxedsimilarly. Another implication of this paper
is that the labor tax rate will affect the real after-tax rate of
return on domestic capital. Therefore, in the
presence of free capital mobility equalization of tax rates on domestic andforeign capital may not be
sufficient to prevent capital flight.
A general butunrealisticfeature of the optima! taxation solution is the accumulationof budget
surpluses in the short run to finance government expenditure withoutrecourse to distortionary taxation
in the long run. This result is due to the fact that reproducible factorsare supplied relatively inelastkafly
in the short run but elastically in the long run. Future research shouldre-examine the issue of dynamic
optimal taxation subject to a realistic set of restrictions on government's behivior.Taxation andEndogenous Growth inOpenEconomies
APPENDIX
Al. VALUE OF PARAMETERS IN EQUATIONS (24)-(26)
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